Since its introduction in 2010 by Lyubashevsky, Peikert and Regev, the Ring Learning With Errors problem (Ring-LWE) has become a popular building block for cryptographic primitives, due to its great versatility and its hardness proof consisting of a (quantum) reduction from ideal lattice problems. But for a given modulus q and degree n number field K, generating Ring-LWE samples can be perceived as cumbersome, because the secret keys have to be taken from the reduction mod q of a certain fractional ideal O ∨ K ⊂ K called the codifferent or 'dual', rather than from the ring of integers OK itself. This has led to various non-dual variants of Ring-LWE, in which one compensates for the non-duality by scaling up the errors. We give a comparison of these versions, and revisit some unfortunate choices that have been made in the recent literature, one of which is scaling up by |∆K | 1/2n with ∆K the discriminant of K. As a main result, we provide for any ε > 0 a family of number fields K for which this variant of Ring-LWE can be broken easily as soon as the errors are scaled up by |∆K | (1−ε)/n .
Introduction: Ring-based versions of LWE
About a decade ago Regev [22] proposed a new hard problem for use in public-key cryptography, namely the learning with errors problem (LWE), which informally stated is about solving an approximate linear system
for an unknown secret s = (s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s n ) over Z/qZ, with q some integer modulus. The entries of A are selected independently and uniformly at random in Z/qZ and the i are small error terms, obtained by sampling from a fixed Gaussian with mean 0 and standard deviation ρ ≥ 2n/π, and reducing the outcome mod q. These errors are elements of R/qZ, but in practice they can be rounded to the nearest element of Z/qZ. To recover s uniquely, the system has to be overdetermined, i.e. m > n. In fact in Regev's model an attacker is allowed to ask for new equations indefinitely, in the (conjecturally vain) hope of learning more information about s: hence the terminology learning with errors.
The LWE problem is being acclaimed for three reasons. Firstly it enjoys a hardness proof in the form of a reduction from worst-case forms of certain well-established lattice problems [22, 20, 3] , providing security guarantees that are lacking for classical hard problems such as integer factorization or discrete logarithm computation. Secondly, it seems that LWE would remain hard in a post-quantum world, unlike the classical problems [23] . Thirdly, LWE has proven to be very versatile for use in cryptography, enabling applications that were not known before, such as homomorphic encryption [5, 2] . Its major drawback however is that the key sizes of the resulting cryptosystems are impractically large, because typically one needs the entire (m × n)-matrix A.
One idea to address this [17, 19] is to use a ring structure R q = Z[x]/(q, f (x)) for some monic degree n polynomial f (x) ∈ Z[x] through the isomorphism (a priori of modules) ϕ :
Z qZ n → R q : (s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s n ) → s 1 + s 2 x + · · · + s n x n−1 .
Each block of n rows of A is replaced with the matrix A a of multiplication by a random ring element a(x), say with respect to the polynomial basis 1, x, . . . , x n−1 , in order to obtain an approximate linear system of the form
which using ϕ can be rewritten as b(x) = a(x) · s(x) + (x). When storing a(x) rather than A a one gains a factor n, thereby addressing the key size issue. The general setup above is called Ring-based LWE (not to be confused with Ring-LWE) and the terminology allows for any error distribution Ψ on R q for the error terms (x). In the remainder of the article, we will consider three variants, all of which sample the error terms from a linear transform of an n-dimensional spherical Gaussian. More precisely, in each case there exists a fixed matrix T ∈ R n×n such that ( 1 2 . . . n ) t arises as the reduction modulo qZ n of T · (e 1 e 2 . . . e n ) t , where each e i is sampled independently from the same normal distribution N (0, ρ 2 ) with mean 0 and standard deviation ρ, which we think of as depending on n only, in a non-negligible and polynomially bounded way. Again in practice one can round i to the nearest element of Z/qZ, but for analytical reasons it is convenient not to do this. The different choices for T are summarized in Table 1 and how these T arise is explained in detail in the next paragraphs.
Poly-LWE can be considered the most straightforward generalization of LWE, in that each error i is drawn independently from N (0, ρ 2 ). In particular, the matrix T is simply the identity matrix. For the sake of analogy one could again impose ρ ≥ 2n/π, although there is no theoretical basis for this. Indeed, restricting to multiplication matrices comes at the cost of giving up on the uniform randomness, thereby invalidating Regev's hardness proof, and in fact it is possible to cook up instances of the problem having certain flaws. For example if f (1) ≡ 0 mod q then b(1) ≡ a(1) · s(1) + e(1) mod q, which can in certain special cases be exploited to obtain information about the secret [13] , thereby mimicking an attack on early versions of NTRU that use arithmetic modulo f (x) = x n − 1, see [16] . This concern is partly addressed by restricting to irreducible f (x) ∈ Z[x], which we do from now on.
Ring-LWE was introduced by Lyubashevsky, Peikert and Regev in [19] and admits a hardness proof akin to the one for general LWE. The main difference is that the error terms are generated in a way that is canonical for the underlying number field K defined by f (x) and in particular, does not depend on the choice of the defining polynomial f (x) itself (unlike Poly-LWE). For the purpose of this introduction, it suffices to think of Ring-LWE samples as Table 1 . Noise distributions T · N (0, ρ 2 ) n in three instantiations of Ring-based LWE, with B the (real) canonical embedding matrix, A f (x) the matrix of multiplication by f (x), and λ ∈ R ≥1 .
above, except that the spherical error vector (e 1 e 2 . . . e n ) is being transformed in the following specific way: 
Here B ∈ R n×n is the Vandermonde matrix (α j−1 i ) i,j generated by the roots α 1 , α 2 , . . . , α n ∈ C of f (x), turned into a real matrix using an easy unitary transformation. The factor B −1 expresses that Ring-LWE errors are actually generated in the codomain of the canonical embedding of the number field K = Q[x]/(f (x)). On the other hand A f (x) is the matrix of multiplication by the derivative f (x) of our defining polynomial. It compensates for the fact that we sampled the secret s(x) from the reduction mod q of R = Z[x]/(f (x)), rather than from the reduction mod q of a certain fractional ideal R ∨ ⊂ K, called the dual of R. It is convenient to think of A f (x) as an integral matrix, i.e. as the matrix of multiplication by f (x) in R with respect to the Z-basis 1, x, . . . , x n−1 , so that Ring-LWE is just Ring-based LWE with
The matrix A f (x) · B −1 transforms our spherical distribution into an ellipsoidal one. In particular the errors in certain coordinates might be systematically much larger than those in others, and they might no longer be independent. But it is crucial to observe that the error coordinates are being scaled up on average, in the sense of the geometric mean. Indeed, one can show that det A f (x) = ∆ and that |det B| = √ ∆, where ∆ denotes the absolute value of the discriminant of f (x). Thus
meaning that on average the errors tend to grow by a factor ∆ 1/2n . SCG Ring-based LWE where SCG stands for Scaled Canonical Gaussian, was analyzed in a series of papers [14, 7, 8] where it was called non-dual Ring-LWE. In this version, one considers samples of the form
where λ ≥ 1 denotes a fixed real number. This variant basically replaces the matrix A f (x) in Ring-LWE by a scalar matrix. The authors called this variant non-dual Ring-LWE since the matrix A f (x) corresponds to the factor coming from working with the dual. However, we will avoid using this terminology, in order not to get confused with non-dual instantiations of actual Ring-LWE, as in (1.2). Note that one cannot simply remove A f (x) (i.e. take λ = 1), since the remaining factor B −1 has determinant 1/ √ ∆, which typically scales down the errors to a point where they become negligible, leading to exact equations in s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s n that can be solved using linear algebra. This is of course highly undesirable, and to remedy this the authors of [14, 7, 8] used λ = ∆ 1/2n , in order to undo the factor B −1 determinant-wise.
This choice of scalar indeed takes back the errors to a reasonable size, but only on average. If the ellipsoidal distribution induced by B −1 is extremely skew then there might be error coordinates that remain negligibly small after scaling. The following example, introduced in [14] and revisited in [6] , illustrates this: for f (x) = x 256 + 8190 the successive radii of the corresponding 256-dimensional ellipsoid go down geometrically, as is illustrated in Figure 1 ≈ 1422.72, the coordinates at the highest 45 indices become zero after rounding, with overwhelming probability. Thus each sample yields 45 exact equations in s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s n , and about six samples suffice to recover the entire secret. If one would take λ = 1 the effect is even more pronounced since then over 240 errors are negligible, and one only requires 2 samples. In general, for this attack to work it is enough that B −1 admits a very short Z-linear combination of its rows. See [21] for a more thorough analysis of all this. To us it seems more natural to take λ = ∆ 1/n : in this way one compensates determinantwise for the removal of A f (x) . For this choice of scalar we are unaware of any attacks on SCG Ring-based LWE and it would be interesting to know whether a variant of the hardness proof of [19] applies here.
The main result of this article is that ∆ 1/n is a lower bound for λ, in the following sense: for each ε > 0 we provide a family of irreducible polynomials f (x) ∈ Z[x] of increasing degree n, for which O(n) SCG samples of the form (1.3) with λ = ∆ (1−ε)/n are sufficient to recover the entire secret using standard linear algebra.
In fact, as we will see, the analogous result also applies to Ring-LWE, for the same families of polynomials. In other words, as soon as one scales down the right-most term in (1.2) by ∆ ε/n then the corresponding samples leak exact equations, again allowing one to find the entire secret easily. However, as suggested by a reviewer, in this case the statement admits an easier proof, based on the trivial fact that 1 ∈ R.
The article is organized as follows. In Section 2 we give a more formal introduction to Ring-LWE, while Section 3 is devoted to the SCG Ring-based LWE version that was studied in [14, 7, 8] . Apart from providing more details, these descriptions will differ slightly from the one given in the introduction: instead of Z[x]/(f (x)) we will work in the potentially larger ring of integers O K of K. Then in Section 4 we state a rigorous version of our tightness result on the scaling factor λ, and provide a proof. Finally in Section 5 we make some additional comments from the point of view of Galois theory.
Ring-LWE set up formally
The actual Ring-LWE problem is formulated using the ring of integers R = O K of a given degree n number field K, which one considers along with a modulus q ∈ Z. A central role is played by the codifferent R ∨ of K, which is defined as the inverse (fractional) ideal of the different ideal ∂ ⊂ R. Alternatively it can be viewed as the dual of R with respect to the trace pairing:
The reductions of R and R ∨ modulo qR resp. qR ∨ are denoted by R q and R ∨ q , respectively. The Ring-LWE problem is then about finding a fixed secret s ∈ R ∨ q from an arbitrary number of approximate equations of the form
where a ∈ R q is chosen uniformly at random and is a small error term sampled from a distribution that will be described in the next paragraph. Recall that everything is to be interpreted modulo qR ∨ . After agreeing upon a Z-basis of R ∨ this can be rewritten as
where the s i are the coordinates of s, the b i are the coordinates of b, the i are the coordinates of , and A a is the matrix of multiplication by a with respect to the chosen Z-basis, all considered modulo qZ n . As for the error distribution, the main role is played by the canonical embedding
where σ 1 , . . . , σ s are the real ring monomorphisms from K to R and σ s+1 , . . . , σ s+2t are the complex ring monomorphisms from K to C (so that n = s + 2t), ordered such that σ s+i = τ • σ s+t+i for i = 1, . . . , t, where τ : C → C : z → z denotes complex conjugation. Thus σ takes values in
which when equipped with the Hermitian inner product ·, · is seen to be isomorphic to the standard inner product space R n , by considering the basis given by the columns of the unitary matrix
It is well-known that under this identification of H with R n , the image σ(I) of a fractional ideal I ⊂ K is a lattice of rank n, and that σ(R ∨ ) is the complex conjugate of the dual lattice
as is immediate from (2.1); more generally σ(I) * = τ (σ(I ∨ )) where I ∨ = (∂I) −1 . Now consider a spherical Gaussian on R n , say with distribution function
where we note that Γ 1 r = N (0, r 2 /2π) and that Γ n r = Γ 1 r × Γ 1 r × · · · × Γ 1 r . We view Γ n r as a distribution on H through the above identification with R n . Pulling it back along the canonical embedding and reducing it mod qR ∨ results in a distribution Ψ r on the torus
from which the errors are to be sampled.
We can now formulate the Ring-LWE problem precisely. Let U(R q ) and U(R ∨ q ) denote the uniform distributions on R q and R ∨ q , respectively. For s ∈ R ∨ q and r ∈ R >0 we let A s,r be the distribution over
, ← Ψ r and returning (a, a · s + ).
Definition 1 (Ring-LWE over a number field K with error parameter r). For a random but fixed choice of s ← U(R ∨ q ) the (search) Ring-LWE problem is to recover s with non-negligible probability from arbitrarily many independent samples from A s,r .
Here it is understood that r ≥ 2ω( √ log n) for some superlinear function ω = ω(n). It may seem surprising that this bound is less restrictive than in standard LWE, where one assumes
But this is only superficial: the lattice of possible products a · s is much denser because s was sampled from R ∨ q , and relative to this the Ring-LWE bound is considerably larger.
In their seminal paper [19] Lyubashevsky, Peikert and Regev provided the following hardness result. They actually deal with a slight variant called the Ring-LWE ≤r problem, where each sample is taken from A s,r for some arbitrary fixed r taken from {(r 1 , . . . , r n ) ∈ (R + ) n | r i ≤ r for all i = 1, . . . , s and r s+i = r s+t+i ≤ r for all i = 1, . . . , t}.
The distribution A s,r is defined in roughly the same way as A s,r , the main difference being that the spherical Gaussian Γ n r is to be replaced by the ellipsoidal Gaussian Γ 1 r1 × Γ 1 r2 × · · · × Γ 1 rn . If we think of the error width r ≥ 2ω( √ log n) and the modulus q ≥ 2 as quantities that vary with n, then the hardness result [19, Theorem 4.1] reads:
Here η ε (I) is the smoothing parameter of σ(I) with threshold ε, and λ 1 (I ∨ ) is the length of a shortest vector of σ(I ∨ ).
The statement involves the discrete Gaussian sampling problem DGS γ , which is about producing samples from a spherical Gaussian in H with parameter r , restricted to the lattice σ(I), for any given non-zero ideal I ⊂ R and any r ≥ γ(I). As discussed in [19] there are easy reductions from standard lattice problems to the discrete Gaussian sampling problem.
SCG Ring-based LWE
To allow for a common framework for Poly-LWE and Ring-LWE, from now on we restrict ourselves to number fields K for which the different ideal ∂ is principal, say generated by θ ∈ R, so that R ∨ = R/θ. This restriction is mainly for convenience: in general one can replace θ in the discussion below by a so-called tweaking factor, see [9, 21] . But principality holds in most cases of interest. For instance if K is monogenic, meaning that the ring of integers R is of the form Z[x]/(f (x)), then one can take θ = f (x). More generally ∂ is principal if and only if R is a so-called complete intersection, i.e. of the form Z[x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ]/(f 1 , f 2 , . . . , f n ), in which case one can take θ = |(∂f i /∂x j ) i,j |; see [11] .
Without loss of generality we can rewrite our sample (2.2) as
where now s ∈ R q and is sampled from Ψ r . Multiplying by θ then gives b = a · s + θ · . After fixing a Z-basis α 1 , α 2 , . . . , α n of R we obtain
where the s i are the coordinates of s, the b i are the coordinates of b, A a is the matrix of multiplication by a, A θ is the matrix of multiplication by θ, and B = U · Σ with Σ the matrix of the canonical embedding σ, all expressed with respect to the basis α 1 , α 2 , . . . , α n . Note that Σ is just the complex matrix having σ(α 1 ), σ(α 2 ), . . . , σ(α n ) as its columns. The e i are sampled independently from the univariate Gaussian Γ 1 r . The formula (3.1) is to be considered modulo q, but note that in the case of the subexpression B −1 · (e 1 e 2 . . . e n ) t it only makes sense to do so after elaborating the product. On average the factor A θ · B −1 causes the errors to expand, because |det A θ | = ∆ and |det B| = |det Σ| = covol(σ(R)) = |∆|, where ∆ = |∆ K | is the absolute value of the discriminant of K; see [15] . Remark 1. In the monogenic case we can take θ = f (x) and work with respect to the basis 1, x, . . . , x n−1 . For these choices we exactly recover (1.2), and we enter the discussion from the introduction. Note that ∆ = |disc f (x)| in this case.
Taking another generator θ of ∂ boils down to replacing the right-most term in (3.1), i.e. the vector of coordinates of the error term θ · , by
for some matrix M ∈ GL n (Z). The same remark applies to switching to another basis of R, in which case M arises as the corresponding matrix of base change. In particular, if for one choice of basis a certain error coordinate is negligible, then for another choice of basis a certain non-trivial Z-linear combination of the error coordinates will be negligible, and conversely.
Example 1. Let β 1 , β 2 , . . . , β n be the basis of R ∨ that is dual to our given basis α 1 , α 2 , . . . , α n of R with respect to the trace pairing. In other words σ(β 1 ), σ(β 2 ), . . . , σ(β n ) ∈ C n are the columns of the conjugate transpose τ (Σ) t of Σ. But then θ · β 1 , θ · β 2 , . . . , θ · β n is also a basis of R, so we can change bases. In this case one verifies that the matrix of base change M is B t · B · A −1 θ , with respect to which our Ring-LWE samples becomes 
If we would express the Ring-LWE samples directly in terms of the basis β 1 , β 2 , . . . , β n of R ∨ then we would find the same formula. Thus in some sense (3.2) is more in the actual spirit of [19] than (3.1), but it is less suited for discussing the SCG Ring-based LWE version from [14, 7, 8] .
Recall from the introduction that the SCG Ring-based LWE from [14, 7, 8] leaves out the multiplication-by-θ step, and compensates for it by a scalar. Formally, one considers samples of the form b = a · s + λ · where s is now taken from R q rather than R ∨ q . As before let a ← U(R q ) and ← Ψ r , and let λ ≥ 1 be a fixed real scalar. Let A λ s,r be the resulting distribution over
returning (a, a · s + λ · ). Then:
Definition 2 (SCG Ring-based LWE with scalar λ). For a random but fixed choice of s ← U(R q ) the problem is to recover s with non-negligible probability from arbitrarily many independent samples from A λ s,r .
When expressed with respect to a basis α 1 , α 2 , . . . , α n of R, such a sample converts into an expression of the form 
Equivalently, one can also just remove the scalar λ and sample the errors e i from Γ λ·r instead of Γ r . Here too switching to another basis amounts to multiplying the right-most factor from the left with a matrix M ∈ GL n (Z). As mentioned in the introduction, the authors of [14, 7, 8] took λ = ∆ 1/2n , while to us the most natural choice of scalar seems λ = |∆| 1/n , in order to compensate determinant-wise for the removal of A θ . It would be interesting to know whether the latter choice allows for a hardness statement similar to Theorem 2.1. If A θ happens to be a scalar matrix itself then both problems are of course equivalent. For instance this is the case if K is the 2 m -th cyclotomic field for some m ≥ 2, where one can take λ = θ = 2 m−1 = n.
Example 2. To illustrate these different flavors of Ring-based LWE, we analyze a simple example that will act as one of the building blocks in our main theorem. Let d ≡ 1 mod 4 be a positive squarefree integer and consider the real quadratic field K = Q( √ d). It has discriminant d and its ring of integers R = Z[(1 + √ d)/2] admits the integral basis 1, (1 + √ d)/2. The different ideal ∂ is the principal ideal generated by θ = √ d. With respect to this basis one has
So a Ring-LWE sample reads
while a SCG Ring-based LWE sample reads
for scaling factor λ = |∆| 1/n = √ d.
For the sake of completeness let us conclude with the setting where one considers (3.1) with the entire matrix product A θ · B −1 replaced by a real scalar λ ≥ 1. In the monogenic case R = Z[x]/(f (x)) where one takes λ = 1 and works with respect to the basis 1, x, . . . , x n−1 , one recovers the Poly-LWE problem from the introduction. Note that in order to compensate for the removal of A θ · B −1 determinant-wise it is more natural to take λ = ∆ 1/2n (here too it would be interesting to know whether the resulting problem enjoys a hardness proof). The more aggressive choice for λ = 1 may be motivated by the error bound in Regev's original work on LWE [22] where there is no number field at play, and by NTRU where the errors are bounded by a small constant. Taking smaller errors has advantages towards the efficiency of the resulting cryptosystems, but the security risks of doing so are not fully understood.
Main theorem
Theorem 4.1. Let ρ : N → R >0 be in poly(n), let (q n ) n∈N be any sequence of integer moduli, and let ε ∈ R >0 be fixed. Then there exists a family of number fields (K ) ∈N such that the following properties are satisfied:
-Each K is Galois over Q.
-The degree n := [K : Q] tends to infinity as does.
-Over K the SCG Ring-based LWE problem with scalar |∆ K | (1−ε)/n , error parameter r = ρ(n ) and modulus q n can be solved in time poly(n · log q n ) using O(n ) samples. The same statement is true for actual Ring-LWE as soon as one scales down the errors by a factor |∆ K | ε/n . Remark 2. We certainly do not claim that all number fields become vulnerable after scaling inappropriately: the fields K that will be constructed below are very special, in the sense that the lattices σ(O K ) and σ(O ∨ K ) are extremely 'skew', i.e. they have widely varying successive minima. In particular our findings do not seem to apply to cyclotomic number fields, which are the main candidates for making their way to daily-life cryptography. Therefore the practical impact of Theorem 4.1 is limited.
Proof of Theorem 4.1: Fix an ≥ 2 and pick prime numbers p 1 , . . . , p congruent to 1 mod 4 such that m := p 1 p 2 · · · p ≥ 2 √ n ρ(n ) log n 2/ε .
(4.1)
For each p i consider the corresponding quadratic field K ,i = Q( √ p i ). It has discriminant p i and ring of integers R ,i = Z[(1 + √ p i )/2], which we equip with the basis α i,1 = 1, α i,2 = (1 + √ p i )/2. We will analyze Ring-LWE and SCG Ring-Based LWE in the field
which is clearly of degree n := 2 . Because the discriminants p i of Q( √ p i ) are mutually coprime this tensor structure carries over to the integral elements [24, Thm. 2.6], i.e. the ring R of integers in K reads
Please do not confuse this notation with our previous notation R q for the reduction of R mod q (in fact the modulus will not play an important role in the current proof). Note that R is a complete intersection, so the different ideal ∂ ⊂ R is generated by θ = √ p 1 √ p 2 · · · √ p = √ m . Therefore the codifferent reads
i.e. it is again naturally compatible with the tensor structure of K . We begin with actual Ring-LWE, where we assume that the samples are expressed with respect to the product basis
where ι abbreviates (i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i ). With respect to this basis a Ring-LWE sample reads:
Here A a and A θ are the matrices of multiplication by a resp. θ = √ m and B −1 = Σ −1 is the inverse of the canonical embedding matrix; note that U = I n ×n because K is totally real. We think of the e ι 's as being sampled independently from Γ 1 r with r = ρ(n )/|∆ K | ε/n , and the whole expression is considered modulo q n .
Because we work with respect to the product basis, the matrix A θ · B −1 arises as the Kronecker product of the corresponding matrices for the quadratic fields K ,i , which by Example 2 are given by
1 .
Note that
so through the Kronecker product we find that
where the row vector on the left has 0's everywhere, except at index ι = (2, 2, . . . , 2) where it has a 1. Thus given a Ring-LWE sample (4.3), we can multiply both sides from the left by the row vector (0 0 . . . 1) in order to end up with a single linear equation in the secret s = (s ι ) ι , perturbed by an error of the form 1 1 . . . 1 · (e ι ) t ι , which behaves as if it were sampled from a univariate Gaussian Γ 1 r with r = √ n · r. Now our primes p i have been chosen in such a way that this error is most likely negligible. More precisely, our bound (4.1) on m implies that r = √ n · ρ(n )
whose absolute value is less than 1/2 with overwhelming probability, so a mere rounding results in an exact linear equation in the secret. In fact by the lemma below, with very high probability we can successfully repeat this during n consecutive rounds, to end up with an exact linear system of n equations in the n unknowns s ι . This system is likely to have full rank (if not we can simply query a few more samples), so that the secret can be recovered using standard linear algebra over Z/q n Z. This concludes the proof in the case of proper Ring-LWE.
To obtain the analogous result for SCG Ring-based LWE using scaling factor |∆ K | (1−ε)/n , one repeats the foregoing reasoning with A θ · B −1 replaced by |∆ K | 1/n · B −1 . The analogue of (4.4) reads
where η(ι) denotes the number of 2's appearing in ι ∈ {1, 2} . The right-hand side is again a norm √ n vector, which is the main ingredient needed for the rest of the proof to apply.
Lemma 4.2. Let P n denote the probability that n independent samples from the univariate Gaussian Γ 1 1/2 √ log n are all at most 1/2 in absolute value. Then P n → 1 as n → ∞.
Proof. Write r = 1/2 √ log n and let z be sampled from Γ 1 r . Then P n equals
where the right hand side is seen to converge to 1 using l'Hôpital's rule.
Remark 3. The fields K that were constructed in the above proof are totally real, but this is not essential. Indeed, if we would also allow primes p i ≡ 3 mod 4 and instead consider the field
then the same conclusions would have followed.
As was pointed out to us by a reviewer, the part of Theorem 4.1 that deals with actual Ring-LWE admits an easier and more broadly applicable proof. Just pick number fields having large enough discriminants, such as the ones constructed in the above proof, and apply the following observation: Theorem 4.3. Let (K n ) n∈N be a family of number fields of increasing degree n, let ρ : N → R >0 be in poly(n), and let (q n ) n∈N be any sequence of integer moduli. Then the Ring-LWE problem in K n with error parameter r = ρ(n) can be solved in time poly(n · log q n ) using O(n) samples as soon as the errors are being scaled down by at least 2ρ(n) √ n log n.
Proof. This is based on the simple fact that 1 ∈ R, which implies that σ(R) always contains the vector (1, 1, . . . , 1) . Thus there always exists a Z-linear combination of the column vectors of Σ = B · U −1 having norm √ n. As a consequence the same Z-linear combination of the rows of B t is of said norm, meaning that given a Ring-LWE sample as in (3.2) , one can extract from it a linear equation in the coordinates of the secret s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s n that is perturbed by an error sampled from Γ 1 ρ(n)· √ n . As soon as one scales this down by a factor of size at least 2ρ(n) √ n log n, by the previous lemma about O(n) samples suffice to recover s.
A cyclotomic point of view
The fields K constructed in the previous section are abelian, more precisely they are Galois with Galois group
where C 2 denotes the group of order two. So by the Kronecker-Weber theorem it should be a subfield of some cyclotomic field. The following lemma shows that it is a subfield of K := Q(ζ m ). We identify the Galois group Gal(K/Q) with G := (Z/(m )) × , where a ∈ G acts on K as ζ m → ζ a m .
Lemma 5.1. Let G 2 be the subgroup of squares in G. Then K is the subfield of K fixed by G 2 .
Proof. Denote the subfield of K fixed by G 2 as K G 2 . For each c ∈ G/G 2 consider
By the Chinese remainder theorem (CRT) we have the isomorphism
according to which the w c 's can be decomposed as follows:
Every sum in the last product is a so-called Gaussian period, where the exponents run through either the quadratic residues or the quadratic non-residues modulo p i . As all p i 's are congruent to 1 modulo 4, such sums result in [10] ). One sees that {w c } c is the product basis of K obtained by equipping the R ,i 's with the Z-bases β i,1 , β i,−1 rather than α i,1 , α i,2 . In particular the w c 's generate K , so K ⊂ K G 2 and the lemma follows by comparing degrees.
As a byproduct of the above proof, we obtain that the w c 's form a Z-basis of R , which is a special case of a more general statement [18, Prop. 6.1] . This kind of 'trace basis' is also used in the recent work on SCG Ring-based LWE by Chen, Lauter and Stange [7] , an example of which we will analyze later in this section. It is interesting to have a quick look at our proof of Theorem 4.1, where now we express the samples with respect to the basis {w c } c , instead of (4.2). Here the factors in the Kronecker product decomposition of A θ · B −1 read
One sees that
So expanding the Kronecker product gives
where ι runs over all tuples (i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i ) ∈ {1, −1} and
i j (this formula explains why we indexed the β i 's by ±1 rather than 1, 2). The row vector (1 1 . . . 1) on the right-hand side of (5.2) has norm √ n , so as before this can be used to obtain linear equations in the coordinates of the secret s that carry negligible error terms, allowing one to recover s by means of simple linear algebra.
Remark 4. As before, the same claims apply to SCG Ring-based LWE and/or to the setting where we allow primes p i ≡ 3 mod 4, upon replacement of every appearance of √ p i by p * i .
Remark 5. The letter J refers to the Jacobi-symbol. Indeed, through the CRT we have
, where if c ∈ G/G 2 corresponds to ι = (i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i ) ∈ {1, −1} , then w c = β 1,i1 β 2,i2 · · · β ,i and J(ι) = (c/m ). Thus if we prefer to think of the rows and columns of the matrices A θ and M as being indexed by c ∈ G/G 2 rather than ι ∈ {1, −1} , then (5.2) becomes
an identity which we found remarkable at first sight.
To conclude this article, we note that more generally, the presence of factors of the form Z[(1 + Under the CRT decomposition (Z/(m)) × ∼ = F × 3 × F × 11 × (Z/(85)) × this subgroup corresponds to {1} × {1} × G 85 where G 85 denotes the index two subgroup of elements having Jacobi symbol 1. We again work with respect to the trace basis and that {w c } c is the product basis
j=1,2,...,10 k=1,−1 .
As in [7] , let us have a look at SCG Ring-based LWE with scaling factor |∆| 1/2n , where ∆ = ∆ K G = (−3) · (−11 9 ) · 85 and n = [K G : Q] = 40. Let M denote the matrix of the canonical embedding of K G with respect to the above basis. Then the last Kronecker factor of |∆| 1/2n · M −1 = |∆| 1/80 · M −1 is given by
So multiplying from the left by (1 − 1) leads to the row vector (1 1)/ 4 √ 85 of norm ≈ 0.4658, which is 'unexpectedly short'. The other Kronecker factors correspond to cyclotomic fields and have less surprising behavior. Here taking the first row (for instance) of each factor leads to norms √ 2/ 4 √ 3 ≈ 1.0746 and √ 10/ 20 √ 11 9 ≈ 1.0750, respectively. Thus multiplying |∆| 1/80 · B −1 from the left by (1, 0) ⊗ (1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) ⊗ (1, −1) yields a row vector of norm ≈ 1.0746 · 1.0750 · 0.4658 ≈ 0.5381. Since Chen et al. let r = 1, this results in a linear equation in the secret s carrying an error term sampled from Γ 1 0.5381 , roughly. By taking other rows of the cyclotomic parts one in fact finds 20 independent such equations. This is insufficient to break this concrete instance of SCG Ring-based LWE using mere rounding (a substantial number of equations will carry an error that exceeds 1/2 in absolute value), but it is tight, so it provides an explanation why this was indirectly helpful for Chen et al. to successfully apply their χ 2 -analysis.
Conclusion
In this paper we explained that if one wishes to set up SCG Ring-based LWE in a degree n number field K, as was done in [14, 7, 8] in the context of potential attacks involving evaluation at 1, then it is natural to scale up the errors by |∆ K | 1/n . More precisely we proved that for each ε > 0 scaling up by |∆ K | (1−ε)/n may indeed be insufficient, in the sense that there exist number fields for which the corresponding problem is easily broken. These observations also apply to proper Ring-LWE, in the sense that scaling down by |∆ K | ε/n leads to vulnerable families for any ε > 0. Some of our families implicitly exploit the structure of the Galois group, which raises the question to what extent Galois theory can be used further in the analysis of the hardness of Ring-LWE.
In any case we stress that the families constructed in this paper are very special. In particular it is unlikely that they will ever be used in a cryptographic context. Our main aim is to help delimit the room of flexibility there is in tweaking the parameters, or even the definition, of
